Tuesday, December 3, 2013

HMES Papers a(1)



If you warn them and they keep on sinning and refuse to repent, they will die in their sins. But you will have saved your life because you did what you were told to do. If good people turn bad and don't listen to my warning, they will die. If you did not warn them of the consequences, then they will die in their sins. Their previous good deeds won't help them, and I will hold you responsible, demanding your blood for theirs. But if you warn them and they repent, they will live, and you will have saved your own life, too. . . Some of them will listen, but some will ignore you, for they are rebels.
For I was hungry, and you didn't feed me. I was thirsty, and you didn't give me anything to drink. 43 I was a stranger, and you didn't invite me into your home. I was naked, and you gave me no clothing. I was sick and in prison, and you didn't visit me.' 44 "Then they will reply, 'Lord, when did we ever see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and not help you?' 45 And he will answer, 'I assure you, when you refused to help the least of these my brothers and sisters, you were refusing to help me.'

Self-doubting prophecy


For nearly five years ago today, we have been goading the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) to enhance its satellite capability instead of simply getting hand-me-down issuances from UN OOSA (United Nations Outer Space Affairs and the NOAA (United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and the other geospatial information and intelligence agencies all over the world.

At a certain point in time around the period of the occurrence of the devastation by tropical cyclone Ketsana (Ondoy) in the Philippines, the PAGASA was clamoring for the purchase and installation of its doppler radar system, an outmoded and unreliable system for weather forecasting.

In 2010, all throughout the government circuit, the company of Mr. Philip King called AAA, went on a lecture-presentation effort to sell the sensing and image capture technology developed by a Malaysian scientist and technology specialist who was also engaged in a similar high technology, extensive venture for the government of Canada, among other countries.

Had the Department of Science and Technology considered using a network of sensing stations with clear-photo capture capability on a 1-camera-per-station (or possibly a cluster of cameras), weather forecasting in the country, aided with charity hand-outs from NOAA, UNOOSA, the European Union, among other satellite capable agencies, will definitely be more precise at the same time vivid and viewable in real time.


It was foreseen in this site that absolutely nothing will be allowed by Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) to block its path. As early as the morning of the raging of this typhoon that PAGASA decided to merely attribute the powerful rains and killer floods to monsoons, it was already the consensus among the advocates that started this site that many people will die by Ketsana (Ondoy).

What kind of weather forecasting transpired during Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) was that by 10:00 AM up to 12:00 noon, PAGASA continued to refuse to declare even a Storm Signal No. 1 for Metro Manila and Rizal Province even at the height of severe rainfall, destructive and killer floods hitting entire subdivisions in Marikina and parts of Rizal, large areas in the urban center of the national capital.

In real time, it was being recommended strongly by this site that a state of calamity and state of emergency already be declared by the Office of the President.

When the media started reporting, albeit belatedly, that some people were reportedly getting killed by Ondoy, it may have dawned on PAGASA that their forecast needed to be amended. Nearing nightfall when panic and frenzy hit the public due to massive negative reports reaching media and feedback filtering through to the lower and highest levels of government, PAGASA relented and finally announced Signal No. 1. It was too late, Malacanang was then preparing to announce a serious state of calamity for the entire Metro Manila including parts of Rizal.

Hundreds died in Provident Village in Marikina. Hundreds died inside a popular Mall at the Riverside commercial complex built beside the huge Marikina River. Still hundreds others were swept by raging waters or seriously injured by stampeding objects and died instantly or were killed by being in the flood and unable to get help for their injuries.

The Haiyan (Yolanda) Fiasco

If the PAGASA did actually issue a warning, albeit introvertedly and timidly, about the storm surge in coordination with the rest of government, the evidence of the storm surge warning only appears at 5:00 AM on d-day, three hours before the storm surge has hit Tacloban City on November 8, 2013 in the national disaster risk reduction agency (NDRRMC) Advisory called Severe Weather Bulletin No. 6.

Still and all, much, much earlier that day, Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) already passed through Tolosa, Leyte and hit neighboring towns beginning its slew of devastations across the entire length of nine Regions of the Philippines.

The NDRRMC Bulletin stated that:
"Residents in low-lying and mountainous (sic) under signal #4, #3, and #2 are alerted against storm surges which may reach up to 7-meter wave height (sic)." 
ACTIONS TAKEN 
o NDRRMC Operations Center disseminated Severe Weather Bulletin No. 6 on Typhoon "Yolanda" to all OCD Regional Centers through SMS and facsimile and uploaded on the NDRRMC website for further dissemination to their respective local disaster risk reduction and management councils (LDRMMCs) from the provincial down to the municipal levels 
o Directed RDRRMCs concerned through the OCD Regional Centers to undertake precautionary measures in their areas of responsibility (AOR) and subsequently advised local DRRMCs to initiate pre-emptive evacuation of families in low-lying and mountainous areas if situation warrants.
Had the one preparing the Severe Weather Bulletin (SWB) not merely cut and paste from one SWB to the next as can be observed in the various and different advisories issued by the NDRRMC, it must have been possible to introduce some new wording into these so-called severe bulletins.

The NDRRMC should have issued directives instead of the de cajon ACTION TAKEN jargon of "take precautionary measures." The directives could have contained marching orders coursed through the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management Councils (RDRRMC) of which the following are members, such as:

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

In connection with the warning of the threat of 21-foot or 7-meter high wave height as stated above, the AFP is hereby ordered to undertake, without need of callback and setoffs, forced evacuation to higher ground of all affected elements and population. . . This is not a drill.

2. Philippine National Police (PNP)

In connection with the warning of the threat of 21-foot or 7-meter high wave height as stated above, the PNP is hereby ordered to provide all manner of assistance to the AFP in the forced evacuation of all affected Service elements and population to higher ground, without need for callback and set off. This is not a drill.

3. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)

In connection with the warning of the threat of 21-foot or 7-meter high wave height as stated above, you are hereby ordered to comply with the forced evacuation order issued to AFP and PNP and to provide all manner of assistance and coordination with all affected officers and personnel of your agency and every item of relief designated for the evacuees, without any need for callback and set off. This is not a drill. . . .

Just because the so-called Severe Weather Bulletin, did not emphatically state to forcefully execute an evacuation to safer ground, people who were caught by the storm surge unaware, got drowned and helplessly died under these 21-foot high waves from storm surges.

In Ground Zero in Tacloban City, two sets of 20-foot high waves converged from opposite directions to create more or less 40-foot high deluges. Even several hundred-ton to several thousand-ton ships were lifted by these approximately 15-meter high waves and brought into the ground in Tacloban City.

If multiple thousand ton objects such as ships, as in the Japan tsunami of 2011, could be lifted by the storm surge into the ground in Tacloban City, it would have been impossible for many people to survive the power and strength of the raging waters, accompanied by the stampede of debris from everything that the flash floods caught along the way.

All the rest of the highly authoritative Severe Weather Bulletins of NDRRMC do not contain a definitive order to evacuate nor even a redundant very stern warning about storm surge and a powerful order to vacate unsafe ground to ensure one's safety and survival.

NDRRMC Update re SWB No.12 (FINAL) for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)

NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.11 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.10 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.10 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.9 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.9 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.8 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.8 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.7 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.7 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.6 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.6 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.5 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.5 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.4-A for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.4-A for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.4 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.4 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.3 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.3 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.2 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.2 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Update re SWB No.1 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)
NDRRMC Advisory re SWB No.1 for Typhoon YOLANDA (HAIYAN)

Next: Reissuing call for a paradigm shift











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